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Introduction
On November 9, 1980 officials of the Bahamian government
arrived at Cayo Lobos, a small uninhabited key close to Cuba, to
return to Haiti 106 Haitians who had been stranded there for
over 30 days without food or water. Despite being in a desperate
state of starvation the Haitians, armed only with sticks and clubs,
drove the Bahamian officials back into the sea saying that they
would rather starve to death than return to Haiti. Two days
later the group was forcibly returned at gunpoint to Haiti,
but others continue to flee to the Bahamas and the U.S.,
becoming part of a flow that has continued for years. There are
now an estimated 35,000 such boat people in southern Florida
and another 300,000 Haitians in New York, most of whom have arrived
by more normal means.
For the past nine years, the U.S. government has resolutely
persecuted, virtually without respite, the Haitian boat people
in southern Florida. Claiming that the Haitians are simply
economic refugees equivalent to the Mexicans in the Southwestern
U.S., the government has detained with unreasonable bonds,
beaten, illegally denied work authorizations to, deported as
many as possible, and strenuously fought Haitian advocates
politically and in the courts. Yet, Haitian boat people continue
to flow into southern Florida, about 1,000 a month currently,
and no Haitians have been deported for three years.
By borrowing and adapting theoretical frameworks from the
structural approach to migration and the dialectical view of
legal repression, this paper attempts to explain why the Haitians
have been so singularly persecuted and, secondly, why the govern-
ment's efforts to expel the Haitians have failed.
Presently, this paper is no more than an exploratory analysis
of work in progress that requires more theoretical development
and empirical verification. It has its roots in my personal
involvement in the Haitian boat people's political and legal
struggle for justice in the U.S. I first became involved with
the Haitian boat people while I was the American Anthropolgy
Association's 1979-80 Congressional Fellow and worked in the office
of Congressman Mickey Leland, a black Democrat from Houston,
Texas. The Congressional Black Caucus had already taken a position
in favor of refugee status for the boat people and, as an "expert"
in Latin American affairs, I was assigned to follow the issue.
I soon obtained an intimate knowledge of the principal
Haitian advocates and a working relationship with the government
officials most directly concerned with the issue. As my involve-
ment deepened, I became increasingly impressed with the seeming
paradox of overwhelming evidence that the boat people deserved
asylum/refugee status under U.S. law and the adamant and
apparently sincere position of government authorities that the
boat people were no more than illegal aliens fleeing poverty.
After the completion of Congressional Fellowship, I began
formal interviews of many present and former government officials
who formulated and implemented the Haitian policy including the
Ambassador for Refugee Affairs, the Commissioner and Deputy
*Commissioners of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, the
Senior Policy Program Officer for Latin American Refugees in the
State Department, and members of Miami's political elite. This
paper utilizes data from those interviews, my personal experiences,
and secondary sources for information on the structural conditions
in Haiti and southern Florida.
Theoretical Framework
This paper borrows from and to a certain extent attempts to
merge two theoretical frameworks: (1) the structural approach to
migration is used to explain the U.S. federal government's
executive branch's efforts to expel the Haitian boat people from
southern Florida and to deter others from entering; and (2) the
dialectical approach to repression is adapted to explain why, in
spite of the U.S. government's efforts, the flow continues unabated
and no Haitians have been deported from the U.S. in three years.
The structural approach to migration depicts population move-
ments as structural forces fundamentally determined by economic
cycles. 2/ Furthermore, within this framework the fate of migrants
is intimately tied to their mode of incorporation into the receiving
economy. Following Portes (1980) the possibilities of incorporation
are: the primary sector which includes mainly legal immigrants; the
secondary sector including primarily illegals in low wage, low skill
jobs; and an enclave sector based on ethnic group's concentration
which is large enough to contain its own market and has individuals
with sufficient capital to start their own enterprises.
On the one hand, Cubans in south Florida have rather success-
fully produced and integrated themselves into an enclave economy,
notwithstanding considerable anti-Cuban backlash in the wake of
the Mariel boatlift.
In the ghetto riots of the 1960s there was a "conflict
between the immediate interest in ending the violence and the
long-run interest in maximizing legitimacy and thereby limiting
revolutionary potential.. 
. legitimacy in the liberal state
resides in the rule of law as an autonomous body of norm and
procedures to which even the sovereign is subject, a legitimacy
principle not easily reconciled with short-run interest in
ending the violence as quickly as possible"(Balbus 1973: 3). In
the case of the ghetto riots, the state maintained the sem-
blance of- formal rationality by resorting to administrative
procedures in which the police and the defendents agreed to minor
criminal charges and the courts assigned abnormally light
sentences. The defense community mounted no sustained effort
demanding amensty or even precise application of the principle
of due process. Implicitly; all shared the goal of re-establishing
order and removing the potentially-revoluntionary threat of
ghetto violence.
The executive branch also views the problem of Haitian boat
people as one of a threat to order with potentially grave
Simplications. However, the defense community of Haitian advocates
has not cooperated in sanctioning administrative procedures with only
a semblance of formal rationality, nor has the court system
condoned them. In this case, the balance between order and
legitimacy based on formal rationality has yet to be struck.
Haitian Migration
Haitian migration is but one part of a much larger flow of
Caribbean peoples. In an earlier era, European industrial
capital, short of cheap labor for the mines and plantationsj.in
the Caribbean colonies, imported millions of slaves and
indentured workers to fill the need. Today, the capital that
is short of cheap labor is not in the Caribbean, but in North
America and Europe, while the Caribbean constitutes a. labor
surplus. In 1980 there were in the U.S. an estimated 50,000
Barbadians, close to half a million Jamacians and some 150,000
Trinidadians, with over half of all these in the New York
metropolitan area (Dominguez and Dominguez 1981).
In the case of Haiti, there is a long history of migration
and temporary sojourns to other countries. Working class
Haitians have served through most of this century as contract
laborers in the Dominican Republic cutting sugarcane at harvest
time. Some Haitians became agricultural workers in the eastern
provinces of Cuban in the 1930s, while sons of the small middle
and upper classes of Haiti have traditionally attended schools
in France.
When Francois, Papa Doc, Duvalier assumed power in 1958 in
Haiti, Haitian emigration took an unprecedented turn. While
political opponents of a new Haitian president have always seen
the wisdom of leaving Haiti, the past 23 years has seen all levels
of Haitian society successively feel the need to leave.
First to leave were the upper elite who stood as direct
threats to Papa Doc's regime. Then came the black middle class
(around 1963) who found the brutality of the Duvalier regime
and the lack of personal and economic security unacceptable.
Next many of the urban proletariat departed (Glick 1975;
Larague 1978; Laguerre 1978). The primary U.S. destination
of these groups has been New York City where it is estimated
there are presently between 200 and 300 thousand Haitians
(Dominguez 1976; Ficklin 1980). They form a most heterogeneous
group reflecting all strata of Haitian society. While many are
legal migrants others are here illegally. Nevertheless, they
are seldom pursued by the Immigration and Naturalization Service
(INS) .authorities in New York (Dominguez, personal communication).
But all these flows are different from that of the Haitian
boat people, those individuals who cram themselves 20-30 at a
time into 25 foot, barely seaworthy boats for a perilous 700 mile
trip to southern Florida, sometimes with stops in Cuba and the
Bahamas. There are now an estimated 25-35 thousand such boat
people in Florida, primarily in the Miami area. In contrast to
the previous flows, the boat people are capital poor. They do
not have sufficient resources to purchase an exit visa and
regular passage. Instead, they usually borrow from neighbors
and relatives enough to pay a smuggler as little as $15 to
clandestinely carry them from Haiti. They are also far less heter-
geneous than those in New York; most are poor, illiterate, creole
speaking peasants (HACAD 1979).
Haiti's Political Economy
The forces pushing the boat people from Haiti are.well
known and require only the briefest summary. According to
World Bank statistics, Haiti is the 27th poorest country in the
world with a per capita income of less than $200/year. It has
20-25% open unemployment, over 50% underemployment, and the lowest
wages in the Western hemisphere.. The World Bank estimates that
over 90% of the incomes are lower than the minimum necessary.
Furthermore, it has one of the world's most inequitable distri-
butions of income and wealth with .8% of the population possessing
44.8% of the wealth.
Papa Doc's brutal, sweeping terror produced a flight not
only of the middle and upper classes, but also of capital producing
a de'clining GNP throughout his reign (IDB 1979). Baby Doc's
succession in 1971 was hailed as marking an end to terror and a
beginning of liberalization. Baby Doc himself has claimed that
he is ushering an economic revolution which will transform Haiti
into a peaceful, stable society progressing toward democratic,
human rights and material prosperity.
In fact, manufacturing activity has greatly increased under Baby
Doc's rule, especially in the assembly sector. With the Western
hemisphere's lowest wages and close proximity to the U.S.,
Haiti offers an unparralled opportunity for investors. Profits are
extraordinarily high -- 30 to 50% on equity -- and capital per
worker very low --- $700 to 3,5000 (IDB.1978).
Yet, the trickledown effects have been negligible. Between
1960-79 GDP per capita growth was .9% annually. Income disparities
between rural regions (which contain 75-90% of the population
depending upon the definition) and urban areas are increasing.
While these economic conditions are deplorable, one must
recognize that in Haiti 
-- perhaps more than anywhere else in
the non-socialist world 
-- the term political economy is most
appropriate. It is estimated that nearly 50% of the state's income
ends up in private hands.. Duvalier controls a vast state mono-
poly, Regie de Tabac, which has exclusive control over distri-
bution of necessities such as fish, cotton, all types of milk and
milk products; plus wine, champagne, whisky, rum, perfumes,
dental products, soap, bandages, air conditioning, autos, airplanes,
and most electrical appliances. In 1977, Regie de Tabac was
estimated to have collected about one million dollars, but only
580 thousand reached the public treasury (Adrien 1978).
Even without corruption, the government's policies.seem
ill-designed for the nation's problems. While 90% of the
population is rural, 83% of government expenditures are in Port-
au-Prince, the nation's capital, and Agricultural expenditures never
exceed 7-10% of the budget. The tax.structure is highly regressive
ignoring luxury imports and targeting the basic commodities
produced and consumed by peasants.
Furthermore, arbitrary repression and persecution have
been the hallmarks of the Duvalier regimes. In 1973, Amnesty
International stated: "Haiti's prisons are still filled with
people who have spent years in detention without ever being charged
or brought to trial...The variety of torture is incredible:
clubbing to death, maiming the genitals, food deprivation to the
point of starvation, and insertion of red-hot pokers into the
back passage. In fact, these prisons are death traps and find a
parallel with the Nazi concentration camps of the past, but have
no present day equivalent." Recently under oath in a U.S.
Federal District Court, a former State Department desk officer
for Haiti described the regime as the "most oppressive in the
world." In 1979 Baby Doc allowed the formation of political
parties and then promptly arrested the leaders of one. The
government imposed censorship on the theater in order to close
down a creole language play that was critical of the government.
In October 1979 a press law was passed that made it illegal
to insult the President for life,.his mother, or other government
officials. Last November, police swept more than 100 of Haiti's
leading independent journalists, human rights activists and
opposition party leaders into jail.
But all of this obvious repression, ignores the terror
and lawlessness characterizing the countryside where government
officials frequently live solely by extortion. It is this
latter, less formal and less visible repression that led one
observer to characterize the Haitian government as a "kleptocracy,
a government by thieves" from the highest to the lowest levels
(Lundhal 1976). It is also this latter form that is most likely to
immediately impel.the boat people to leave. Finally, it is this
latter form that is most likely to be disbelieved and dismissed
by U.S. government authorities as not really being political
persecution.
Haitian Integration in South Florida
The pull factors in south Florida pale in comparison to
the push factors from Haiti or the pull factors of other migratory
flows in the U.S. While it is trite to observe that wages and
working conditions are higher in southern Florida than Haiti,
it must also be noted that the specific conditions in the Miami
area are not as attractive for unskilled, low wage labor-as
in New York or the Southwest which have much larger secondary
labor markets.!
The east coast migratory stream has incorporated some of
the boat people, but 25-35 thousand remain in Maimi. While
Miami's economy may have been rejeuvanated by Cubans,/the 1980
riots reveal the frustration of American blacks; By being
willing to work at lower wages for longer hours and to tolerate
worse working conditions, Haitians may be taking away some of
the local secondary labor market opportunities from American
4/
blacksy nevertheless, the lack of local opportunities led Dade
County health authorities to claim that the primary health
problems among Haitians were malnutrition and starvation.
The extreme conditions pushing the boat people from Haiti
and the relative absence of opportunities in south Florida has
produced tension and contradictory tendencies at both the local
and national levels. In contrast to the ten times as many
Haitians in New York or other "illegal aliens," throughout the
U.S., the Haitians in Florida have suffered through consistent,
determined efforts by the U.S. government to expel them.
Anti-Haitian Forces
Since 1972, national political authorities with an impetus
from local political elites have attempted to deter the flow
and deport those Haitians already in Florida. Members of south
Florida's political elite, including Democratic party members,
elected officials, and some Cubans, believed that the boat
people were a disruptive force destroying the community and
draining public resources. They appealed to their.local congress-
men who apparently pressured the INS into a response. The
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) proceeded to
expend far greater effort against the Haitians than nearly any
other group.-/
Stability and control were the central themes articulated
by the anti-Haitian forces. Local elites felt their community
was disrupted, while federal authorities in the executive branch
saw it as a part of the larger problem of "out of control"
6/immigration.-
In response to this persecution most of the Haitians have
claimed political asylum, but the INS with the support of the
State Department has rejected these claims contending that the
Haitians are simply economic refugees equivalent to the Mexican
undocumented aliens. The.goverment's argument cleanly cleaves
the economic from the political (far more cleanly than is
actually the case in Haiti) as revealed in informal statements
by State Department officials: Haitians are poor peasants, and
peasants are not political...Underdevelopment may have political
underpinnings but its decades and decades; we can't handle that
problem through immigration because Haiti is no different from
any other developing country; we would be overwhelmed with
immigrants.
Some officials further elaborate by resurrecting the 1950s
dichotomy between authoritarian and totalitarian governments.
They claim totalitarian governments have no freedoms / In contrast,
according to this argument, authoritarian governments have some
freedoms,.. For example, in the House subcommittee on immigration
hearing on Haitian refugees in 1980, Chairwoman Holtzman asked
the State Department's human rights officer on Haiti what he
could say positively about human rights conditions in Haiti.
After stammering uncomfortably for awhile,.he finally mumbled
that Haiti has religious freedom.
By implication, all individuals fleeing totalitarian govern-
ments are ipso facto fleeing persecution;and they and countries
friendly to us (i.e. opposing totalitarianism) deserve our help.
In contrast authoritarian countries only persecute individuals
who are "politically involved," i.e. participants in organized,
institutionalized activities such as political parties. Any
others fleeing authoritarian governments can only be fleeing
dire economic conditions. Individuals who may be attempting to
avoid extortion by local officials are not fleeing persecution,
but personal disputes.
Thus, admitting Haitians as refugees would set a precedent
"opening the floodgates" to immigrants from other authoritarian
regimes. The strategy of the executive branch is, therefore,
substant,ively to deny the Haitians access to the economic
opportunities they are seeking and ideologically to screen out
evidence that blurs the political/economic cleavage or which
contends that Haitian boat people have been or would directly be
subject to persecution in Haiti.
Haitian Advocates
At the same time that the government has attempted to
expel the Haitian boat people, a constellation of Congressional
and nongovernmental groups at the local and national levels
has diligently worked to obtain a permanent legal status for
the Haitians. At the Miami level the most visible supporters of
the Haitians have been the media, especially second generation
Cuban-Americans, who have been joined by the small liberal branch
of the Democratic party in Florida, the churches and the established
legal Haitian community. Organized support from local Miami
American blacks has been notably absent, although this may be
more a result of a lack of local black political organization
rather than a lack of sympathy.
At the national level, church groups, particularly the
National Council of Churches, were the first to become involved
followed by public interest lawyers, national black groups
(particularly the Congressional Black Caucus), and more loosely
other civil rights organizations, unions, and eventually state
and local officials who have a fiscal interest in legalizing the
Haitians' status.
The advocates believe that the INS has prejudged the Haitians I
claims for political asylum and has subjected them to discriminatory
treatment based on race and ideology. In short, the Haitians
have been denied due process and equal protection in their
claims for asylum. Furthermore, the conditions in.Haiti are
such that most, if not all, of the Haitian boat people have
justifiable claims to political asylum. The strategy of the
advocates has been twofold: First, to build networks of support
by disseminating information on political and economic conditions
in Haiti and the U.S. government's mistreatment of the boat people;
secondly, the Haitian advocates have used the legal system to
press their claims of denial of due process and discriminatory
treatment.
The Courts and the Law
Although the tenor of the Supreme Court regarding a
Fourteenth Amendment-Equal Protection concern for aliens is
8/increasingly conservativeT in numerous cases the courts have
decided in favor of aliens including the rights of alien children
9/to public education.-
Previous to 1980, U.S. immigration law clearly discriminated
in favor of refugees from communist countries (and particular
nations in the middle east). In those cases, the law offered
a blanket presumption of persecution and automatic eligibility
for asylum-refugee status. Other aliens had to first prove
individual political persecution through an INS asylum hearing.
If the INS agent ruled against the applicant, the decision could
be appealed first to the INS district director, then an immigra-
tion judge of the Board of Immigration Appeals, and finally
through the hierarchy of Federal courts. In fact, the vast
majority of individuals in the U.S. who have been accorded
refugee status have been those fleeing communist regimes.
Congress designed the Refugee Act of 1980 with the explicit
intent of eliminating the previous law's discrimination and
inequality. The new standard was adopted from the 1967 UN
Protocal for Refugees: an individual who has a "well founded
fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group or political opinion."
Thus, to obtain refugee status under the new law, Indochinese,
Cubans, El Salvadoreans, and Haitians, for example, all would
need to establish a well founded fear of persecution. Under the
previous law, INS had a legal basis for requiring "proof of
persecution" from Haitian boat people or El Salvadoreans requesting
asylum, but could avoid this administrative requirement for the
others.
The Dialectic
i\
Other.than a small group from the Haitian Coast Guard who
had fled after firing on the Presidential Palace in 1971,
virtually all Haitian claims for political asylum have been
denied by INS. In 1972, the National Council of Churches and
public interest lawyers.employed by them first challenged INS
processing of Haitian asylum claims. The flow of boat people
at that time was only about 1,000 a year, but the flow was
sufficiently ample and the appeal process sufficiently cumber-
some, that an unmanageable backlog of asylum cases accumulated.
Some Haitians were deported, but not nearly at the same rate
that they arrived. In. an effort to discourage further Haitians
from coming, the U.S. government made it as difficult as possible
for the Haitians to work. Most were- detained, in some cases as
far away as El Paso, Texas, with bonds set at a minimum of $500.
For those who were released on bond, INS denied them work authoriza-
tions. .
Soon south Florida's prisons were overcrowded with Haitians
living in conditions appalling even to the INS authorities .
responsible for placing them there. In November 1977, INS
Commissioner, Leonel Castillo, and the National Council of
Churches entered into an agreement to release Haitians without
bond and to issue them work authorization permits. Although. the
-agreement stipulated issuance of work authorizations only to
Haitians "known to INS," INS publicy announced through the media
that any Haitian could come to INS, identify him or herself,
and receive a work authorization. About 5 thousand Haitians
received work authorizations, many of whom were not previously
known to INS.
While this policy may have been humanitarian for the
Haitians, it produced a backlash on Capitol Hill. In the Spring
of 1978 in the Senate hearings for the Department of Justice
authorization for fiscal year 1979, the Chairman of the Committee
on the Judiciary suggested that the wholesale issuance of work
authorizations was indiscrimanate and unlawful. Instead the
chairman felt that Haitian work authorizations should have been
granted on the more limited statutory basis of need only for
those individuals appealing asylum claims. Soon thereafter,
INS reversed its new humanitarian policy.
In July of 1978, INS began implementing the "Haitian Program,"
a streamlined administrative procedure designed to eliminate the
asylum backlog as quickly as possible. All Haitians who had
identified themselves in November and received work authorizations now
received notice of deportation hearings. Previous to the "Haitian
Program," there were 10 hearings a day for all nationalities in
the Miami INS district office. In July of 1978 it was upped to
60 just for Haitians and by September Haitian deportation hearings
had reached 150 a day. INS had prepared presigned forms of
asylum denial which were presented to every Haitian after his
hearing.
The Haitian advocates quickly resorted to the courts claiming
denial of due process and an unlawful revocation of work authoriza-
tion. Last July Federal District Court Judge King ordered INS
to revamp their asylum procedures for Haitians. In his decision,
Judge King found "a pattern of discrimination (against the Haitians).
The Haitian boat people, however, possess neither the human nor
financial capital for creation of and integration'into either an
enclave or the primary sector. Their only alternative
is south Florida's relatively underdeveloped secondary labor
market.
When migrants cannot find an appropriate mode of integration
into the receiving economy, they become an unwanted, redundant
labor pool. During such times, we may expect official policies
to halt incoming flows and repatriate those already present
(Portes 1977; Bustamante 1978) ..
However, in some cases, these repressive tendencies may be
constrained by contradictory tendencies within the advanced
capitalist state. In a study of the black ghetto riots of the
1960s, Balbus (1973) describes the dialectical relationship
between the state's substantive need to maintain order and the
concurrent requirement to maintain legitimacy through a formally
rational system based upon the principles of due process and equal
protection. Policies in the liberal capitalist state are judged
as much by the modes of action they embody as by their results.
Repression by the state, even if in the substantive interests
of both elites and other classes, cannot ignore the principles
of equal protection and due process with impunity.
The evolution of an independent legal system founded on the
principles of due process and equal justice was propelled by the
bourgeoisie to eliminate the arbitrary intervention of the state
in its profit making activities. The rights to property on which
capitalistic enterprise is founded were accorded legal security
through a formally rational system which ensured equal protection
and due process regardless of ascriptive status. Structually,
this requirement was expressed in the evolution of a judicial
sphere formally autonomous from the political executive and
maximally immunized against governmental and other pressure.
The importance of the principles of due process and equal
treatment has evolved within contemporary U.S. society to the
point of producing groups, such as the ACLU and other public
interest law firms, whose sole purpose is advancement of these
principles of formal rationality.
Under normal circumstances, political elites attempt to
harmonize the substantive goals of protecting and advancing
capital accumulation with those of formal rationality, but there
are times when the two conflict and a balance must be struck
that favors one over another. When there is a perceived threat
to societal order, the sine gua non of political responsibility,.
political elites are especially likely to abrogate the.norms of
formal rationality in favor of the substantive goal of order.
In such cases, the e fort to maintain "law and order" may
rapidly degenerate into sacrificing an interest in law to the
pressing exigencies of establishing order. When large numbers
advance political claims contrary to the elites interests or
established order, the legal system's requirement of due process
and equality in each individual case becomes a frustrating
impediment to the state and the temptation to resort to administra-
tive procedures abrogating formal rationality is frequently
irresistable.
Over the past 17 years, Haitian claims for asylum and refuge have
been systematically denied, while all others have been granted.
The recent Haitian Program is but the largest scale, most
dramatic example of that pattern."
While strongly condemning, both the U.S. and Haitian
governments, the ruling stopped short of extending a permanent
legal status to the Haitians. It did, however, provide findings
of fact which clearly suggested that the Haitians had a "well
founded fear of persecution." For example, it quoted testimony
of former Haitian government officials describing Haitian
government policy of persceution of expatriates returned to
Haiti. Nevertheless, it refrained from directly granting a
permanent legal status for Haitians in the U.S. Instead it
returned that function to the executive branch, particularly
INS, with orders that it follow the principles of due process
and equal protection.
Some individuals within the executive branch argued that
the ruling should be accepted and reprocessing commence as
expeditiously as possible. However, others,particularly those
in the State Department, felt that by delving into evaluations
of the Haitian government and the treatment of Haitian nationals
by the U.S. government, the court has established a dangerous
precedent for interference in the formulation of U.S. foreign
policy. A few individuals in the executive branch were convinced
by the court case that at least some Haitians had a "well founded
fear of persecution," but virtually everyone in State; Justice,
and the White House believed that persecution in Haiti is
comparable to other non-communist, developing country regimes
and extending refugee status to the Haitians would open the
floodgates overwhelming us with "economic refugees" from the
developing world.
Judge King's decision came in the midst of the Cuban
boatlift from Mariel. Within a few weeks, President Carter
signed the Refugee Act of 1980 which was supposed to rationalize
U.S. refugee policy, an uncontrollable flow of Cubans poured
into Key West, and Judge King found the U.S.. treatment of Haitians
prejudicial in the extreme. The ironies in the juxtaposition
of these events were not ignored by the media or the Haitian
advocates.
The vacillations and chaos in the Carter Administration's
handling of the Cuban crisis received by far the media's major
attention, but the local Miami media and some of the national
media noted the blatant inconsistencies between treatment of the
Cubans and the Haitians. The contrasts were especially dramatic
when.arriving Cubans stated that their primary motivation for
leaving Cuba was economic betterment. Clearly the U.S. govern-
ment could not welcome Cubans who were self proclaimed economic
refugees while rejecting Haitians for allegedly being no more
than economic refugees. Accepting Cubans while rejecting
Haitians would be at once racist and ideologically biased. Haitian
advocates were quick to advance charges of discriminatory treatment.
The Congressional Black Caucus organized letters of protest
signed by the members of the Black Caucus, plus numerous other
members of Congress, civil rights leaders, and union officials.
Senator Kennedy, who was then still competing for the Democratic
Presidential nomination and Chairman of the Senate Judiciary'
Committee, held hearings on the Cuban-Haitian crisis and grilled
Victor Palmieri, Carter's Ambassador for Refugee Affairs, on the
Administration's double standard.
At the same time, Florida state and local officials were
consumed by the influx and were pleading for federal assistance.
Since the Cubans and Haitians were both technically illegal
aliens, there were only limited funds available. However, if the
aliens were classified as refugees they would become eligible
for a wide-range of federally subsidized reimbursements and special
programs. Florida's state and local officials were soon pressing
for refugee status for both Cubans and Haitians. The Cuban
crisis catapulted the Haitians into the national scene. Previously
the boat people were a local Miami and INS problem. Now the
White House became intimately involved.
In May and then again in June, President Carter announced
and detailed the Administration's new Cuban-Haitian policy.
In brief, he promised equal treatment and a temporary legal
status for both Cubans and Haitians, but refugee status for
neither. Instead he suggested a singular status, Cuban-Haitian10/
EntrantTto be created by special Congressional legislation. To
appease state and local authorities, Entrants would be eligible
for most of the programs available to refugees; to satisfy the
public's demand for decreased federal spending, they would not
be eligible for the full range of federal programs. The admini-
stration justified this ad hoc approach by deploring the past
discriminatory treatment, and explicitly stating that refugee
status for either group would undermine the meaning and intent
of the Refugee Act of 1980. Off the record, everyone admitted
that political realities demanded the acceptance of the Cubans.
While Congress deliberated on the special legislation, the Attorney
General granted the Cubans and Haitians who arrived before October
10, 1980 a 6 month renewable parole. Meanwhile two Florida
legislators, Congressman Fascell and Senator Stone, introduced
and engineered the passage of an amendment that provided interim.
federal funding for state and local authorities and resettlement
of the entrants.
The special legislation died in the last session of Congress
and although re-introduced this session, as Congress waits for
Reagan's lead on the issue hearings have still not been held.
Meanwhile, at a national level, the crisis has abated. The Cuban
influx has stopped and Haitians continue to arrive at the somewhat
manageable rate of about 1,000 a month. In late April INS began
efforts to deport the post October 10 Haitian arrivals. Most
recently, the Reagan Administration is considering plans to
interdict the flow of the Haitians by intercepting their boats
on the high seas and forcing a return to Haiti. Furthermore,
while there have been public promises that the entrant status
parole will be renewed if legislation is not passed, there have
been internal memoranda from INS and the Department of Labor
indicating that Haitians will not be eligible for work authorizations
after July 1981. The Cuban-Haitian Entrant Program therefore,
provided but a brief respite from the resolute policy'of the U.S.
government to reject the Haitian boat people from southern Florida.
Meanwhile Judge King's decision requiring revamped INS processing
of Haitian asylum claims has been granted an expedited hearing in
the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. The case will undoubtedly
be appealed to the Supreme Court. Finally, the Haitian advocates.
are busily preparing a political campaign and court cases to
stop the executive branch's efforts to deport the post October 10
Haitian arrivals.
Conclusions
The structural approach to migration is appropriate for
explaining the source and nature of anti-Haitian forces.
Although further documentation is needed on the Haitians incorpo-
ration into the local Miami economy, it appears as if the lack
of opportunities in the secondary sector have led to the perception
on the part of local political elites that the Haitians are a
disruptive force threatening local order and stability, and are a
drain on public resources. Spurred by local pressure, the
federal executive branch, specifically INS, has attempted to
use immigration law and INS procedures to exclude the Haitian
boat people. National authorities, too, view the Haitians as
a threat to stability, although this time the threat is not
simply to local stability but national and international stability
as well. Granting legal status to the Haitians, particularly
refugee status, would allegedly set a precedent for easy access
of individuals from developing countries. As a result, the U.S.
would be over-run with uncontrollable numbers of immigrants
and the sending societies simultaneously destabilized by the
United States' acknowledgement of repression by friendly govern-
ments.
In spite of the internal consistency of the anti-Haitian
ideology and the resolute efforts of INS to deport the boat
people, the flow of boat people still stands at over 1,000 a month
and no Haitians have been deported from the U.S. in three years.
Haitian advocates have used the Cuban crisis, political
organization, INS rules and regulations, and the courts to render
ineffective the executive branch's anti-Haitian policy. On a
couple of occasions, under pressure from the Haitian advocates
the executive branch has moderated their policy towards the
Haitians. First, in 1977 when it curtailed detention of Haitians
and issued work permits to all interested Haitians, and secondly
when Carter announced and implemented the Cuban-Haitian
Entrant Program. But in both cases, the policies of moderation
were soon followed by renewed persecution.
The Haitian advocates have based their position on the
principles of due process and equal protection. The executive
branch's classification of Haitians as "economic" refugees has
been countered by contrasting the Haitians with Cubans and other
groups who have equal or less claim to persecution yet have been
accorded refugee status. Moreover, the INS administrative
procedures to eliminate the backlog in Haitian asylum claims
have been fought with court suits alleging denial of due process.
In contrast to the cooperation between the executive,
judiciary, and the defendent community which Balbus (1973)
found in the resolution of the ghetto riots,the.Haitian advocates
have consistently pressed for the full application of the
principles of.due process and equal treatment; and the court,
to this point, has sided with the Haitian advocates. The
executive branch meanwhile has consistently pressed for a reversal
of the court's decisions. One-of their primary arguments has
been that the courts have no jurisdiction in matters dealing
with foreign policy. In short, the executive branch is attempting
to maintain both order and the legitimacy of the system of formal
rationality, by removing this issue from the legal system's purview.
The case of the Haitian boat people confirms Balbus (1973)
observation of a tension between the state's need for the order and its
foundation of legitimacy on the principles of due process and
equal protection. However, a balance between order and formal
rationality is not always easily struck, nor does it always
degenerate into choosing order over law. In this case, different
branch's of the state, besides different sectors of society,
seek different balances. The executive branch seeks to exclude
the boat people and maintain order, whereas the judicial.branch
favors upholding the principles of due process and equal
protection. Meanwhile the Congress has failed to act decisively
with some sectors strongly supporting the Haitians and Florida
legislators vacillating by seeking to maintain order and federal
fiscal involvement. The highest levels of the executive branch
have remained aloof from the issue except during the Cuban crisis,
when the threat to order was most imminent. Then a limited
resolution was sought which by its limited applicability
avoided further disruption of order but also failed to ultimately
solve the problem. The dialectic is likely to continue until
the state can establish within itself which principle, order or
formal rationality, should take precedence in this particular case.
FOOTNOTES
1. Work for this paper has been supported by the American
Anthropology Association's Congressional Fellowship Program,
an NIMH postdoctoral fellowship in Duke University's program in
Comparative Studies in Immigration and Ethnicity, the Ford
Foundation, Minority Group Rights, and the Alien Rights
Law Project of the Washington Lawyers' Committee for Civil
Rights Under Law.
2. The literature in this field is rapdily expanding, including
most of the papers presented at this conference. Other
principal works include: .Bach 1978; Barrera 1976;
Bustamante 1975, 1978; Cardenas and Flores 1977; Castells
1975; Castles and Kosack 1973; Freeman 1978, 1979; Gorz 1970;
Markovits and Kazarinov 1978; Nickolinakos 1975; Pessar and
Grasmuck 1979; Piore 1973, 1976, 1979; Portes 1977, 1978a,
1978b, 1979.
3. Portes and his associates have produced a number of articles
on Cubans in Miami (Portes; Portes 1980; Portes and
Bach 1978; Haug and Portes 1980; Wilson and Portes 1980).
Also, Light (1972) has demonstrated this phenomenon for
Korean, Japanese and Chinese immigrants for late 19th and
early 20th century Jews in the.Midwest and Eastern U.S.
4. This presently is no more than a hypothesis for which I am
currently collecting data.
5. Recently the only comparable cases are Iranians and
El Salvadoreans.
6. The recently completed report of the Select Commission on
Immigration and Refugee Policy implicity makes the same
assumption.and Senator Simpson (R-WY), chairmen of the
Senate Immigration subcommittee explicitly stated the same
point in a letter to the Washington Post (April 30, 1981).
7. A few further explain that totalitarian governments are out
to defeat capitalist systems, an argument which links to
the first concern with stability.
8. cf. Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68 (1979) and Foley v.
Connolie, 435 U.S. 291 (1978).
9. See especially Doe v. Plier which is still under appeal.
10. Within the bureaucracy the program was ironically referred
to as CHE.
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